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Abstract:
The global power shift that started over a decade ago has taken a most curious turn in recent 
years with the decadence of great power politics and the rise of new contenders. The multiple 
crises of globalization are imminent on international system. These multiple crises entail a nearly 
synchronistic eruption of the following international conundrums: 1) a global economic crisis that 
consists of a financial crisis, global recession and unemployment; 2) a crisis of hegemony and 
power that comes about with lack of leadership, multipolarity, a deluge within Western modernity 
and the emergence of multiple, alternative modernities; 3) the crisis of civilization accompanied by 
global climate change, energy scarcity, depleting food resources, and eroding global social justice 
with skyrocketing rates of poverty, uneven and “uncompassionate” development, and inequality. 
All in all, the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the 2008 global financial meltdown, and the recent 
uprisings in the broaderMiddle East have exposed the 
deep cracks in the foresight, reach, and capacity of the 
great powers. Amidst today’s uncertain world order, 
the U.S. hegemony dwindles; the European Union is 
fatigued; and a number of emerging regional actors 
rise to fill the vacuum. 
What has come to be known as the “emerging powers” 
share a number of characteristics, such as high and 
steady growth rates, political and economic stability, 
a sphere of influence over their vicinity, and tangible 
contributions to the good of international order. 
Moreover, they aspire to be more assertive in shaping 
global politics. They therefore request recognition as 
“pivotal actors” of regional and global politics. They 
consequently demand more representation in the 
decision-making bodies and processes of critical 
international organizations ranging from the UN Security 
Council to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
However, granting this collective wish of the emerging 
powers comes at a price. That is, claiming stake in 
global decision-making compels emerging powers to 
share the traditional actors’ burden in addressing such 
vital global issues as armed conflicts, human rights 
violations, poverty, deteriorating health conditions, 
environmental degradation and climate change. In other 
words, a power shift from the metaphorical global North 
to South puts significant pressure on emerging regional 
actors to become responsible actors of development.
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Emerging markets such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, South Africa) and the rising regional 
actors like Turkey, Indonesia, and Mexico are 
increasingly considered as alternatives to traditional 
Western donors of official development assistance and 
humanitarian aid. Each country has enjoyed at least a 
decade of economic growth, relative political stability, 
and influence over the course of critical international 
issues. Their successful domestic performances have 
helped most of these countries reinforce their image 
as reliable regional powerhouses. Brazil, for instance, 
has lived up to this reputation by committing significant 
development aid to Latin American countries and 
security assistance to fragile states such as Haiti. 
China’s involvement in Africa has been growing 
gradually and rapidly.
Similarly, Turkey’s reputation as a “humanitarian state” 
rings louder over a vast territory from the broader 
Middle East and North Africa to sub-Saharan Africa, 
Central and South Asia to the Balkans. The reference 
“humanitarian state” signifies a distinctive attribute of 
the Turkish aid model from that of both established 
and emerging donors. Subsequently, the purpose of 
this paper is to shed light on Turkey’s humanitarian 
assistance model. The paper analyses the Turkish 
model in a comparative fashion with the eneging 
powers, and by exploring the ways in which it differs 
from the other donors’ aid policies and strategies. 
Moreover, it assesses the strengths and shortcomings 
of the Turkish humanitarian and civilian capacity 
assistance to conflict-sensitive territories. The study 
concludes with concrete policy recommendations to 
improve Turkey’s humanitarian engagement with the 
beneficiaries on the ground.
“Humanitarian state” unveiled
The concept “humanitarian state” is not just a matter 
of semantics; it has significant methodological 
connotations and implications for a state’s foreign 
Turkey chooses state building over nation building. This 
is a natural extension of an essential Turkish foreign 
policy principle that dismisses a “values-free realpolitik 
agenda, solely focused on advancing its economic 
and security interests.”4 Ethics, civil rights, upholding 
human dignity and integrity, on the other hand, make 
the central tenets of Turkish foreign policy. Ascending 
on these values, the humanitarian state approach is 
free from ideological impositions of nation building; it 
prioritizes good governance and best practice-driven 
development and humanitarian assistance without any 
conditions based on race, gender, ethnicity, or religious 
orientation. Humanitarian state, all in all, encompasses 
any official and private relief initiative that enables 
resources and best practices—free of conditions or 
earmarks—for the reconstruction of institutions and 
infrastructure that are critical for people in conflict 
sensitive areas to live in dignity, prosperity, and peace.
These specific connotations of “humanitarian state” 
in the Turkish aid development assistance glossary 
place Turkey in a category of its own. Because Turkey 
in principle does not tie its aid to political, military, 
economic conditions, the breadth and implementation 
of its humanitarian assistance missions diverge 
greatly from the practices of the established donors. 
In the same vein, it is also difficult to group Turkey 
with emerging donors. There are a number of plain 
differences in Turkey’s and BRICS’ engagement with 
beneficiaries in terms of the depth and breadth of their 
strategies. The BRICS countries such as India and 
South Africa, for instance, prefer concentrating their 
assistance in one specific area. India, for instance, 
channels most of its aid to robust peacekeeping in 
conflict regions. Brazil, similarly, is heavily involved 
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Ethics, civil rights, upholding 
human dignity and integrity, on 
the other hand, make the central 
tenets of Turkish foreign policy.
As a country with vast outreach 
and depth, Turkey extends a mix 
of assistance.
policy priorities. As such, “humanitarian state” is rather 
a strategically crafted concept that demarcates state 
building and nation building, and it reveres the former 
over the latter. In that, the promotion of state building 
in Turkish foreign policy vernacular indeed accents a 
discursive debate that transcends beyond any national 
or cultural confines. Fukuyama offers one of the most 
compelling comparisons of the two concepts and 
highlights the virtues of the state building in his writings 
on U.S. nation building campaigns in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.1 A valid criticism that Fukuyama considers in his 
2004 Atlantic article suggests an important fallacy 
of nation building: that is, “outsiders can never build 
nations, if that means creating or repairing all the cultural, 
social, and historical ties that bind people together as 
a nation.”2 Fukuyama asserts that any initiative that 
seeks reconstruction of political infrastructure of the 
recipient country in the image of the donor country can 
be classified as nation-building. On the other hand, 
the cases where national unity is preserved and “the 
underlying social and political infrastructure remains 
relatively intact” skew more toward state building.3 State 
building therefore can be achieved by strictly targeting 
the rebuilding of fundamental state institutions that are 
vital for economic development, as well as to ensure 
government’s efficacy. In other words, the overarching 
principle of state building, and that which corresponds 
with the European view on the matter rather than the 
U.S. approach, is that nations cannot be built, only 
institutions can.
in preservation of public safety and order in conflict-
affected countries. Russia, on the other hand, 
persistently refuses to commit monies; it rather delivers 
in-kind aid. As a country with vast outreach and depth, 
Turkey extends a mix of assistance ranging from on-
the-ground training of doctors, police, prosecutors, 
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fishermen, farmers to water purification and nutrition. 
Furthermore, Turkey does not deliberately seek to 
create or reinforce a sphere of influence through its aid, 
while a few emerging donors associate investing in the 
future of fragile societies with their longer term national 
and regional interests.
Against this backdrop, Turkey’s short but voluminous 
track record as a humanitarian state offers insights into 
the virtues of bilateral and unconditional assistance. 
Yet, the prospect of improving Turkey’s capacities 
as a reliable actor of development also allows room 
for a debate on the benefits of joining multilateral 
system and consideration of certain conditions for 
the sake of accountability, transparency, and effective 
distribution of aid. But all in all, Turkey’s and BRICS’s 
rise as alternative donors bring along two prominent 
questions: The first question is more fundamental, and 
it has overwhelmingly represented the interests of a 
handful of great powers while excluding the majority 
of rising economies and the G20 actors from the 
decision making bodies of influential intergovernmental 
organizations.6 BRICS have argued that this model was 
no longer maintainable. From financial crises to wars, 
global climate change to environmental degradation, the 
policies of a minority of industrialized powers continue 
to have detrimental effects on the sustainable and 
inclusive growth trajectories of developing countries. 
Therefore, the BRICS countries and other emerging 
markets such as Turkey, Indonesia and Mexico appear 
to be exploring an alternative and more equitable 
global order that is defined by peaceful coexistence 
and stability. Many an emerging economy has its own 
conceptualization of peaceful coexistence. But all the 
definitions seem to highlight the following unequivocal 
principle of peaceful coexistence: the common interest 
of states in promoting the socioeconomic welfare of not 
only their citizens, but also that of other states.7
Official development assistance (ODA) and 
humanitarian assistance as an important component of 
ODA are useful instruments available to states that do 
not only pursue their own development goals, but also 
strive to pull up the rest of the international community. 
It is important to give the definitions of humanitarian 
aid and official development assistance for further 
clarity and distinction. According to the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) 
definition, humanitarian assistance is a form of 
“assistance designed to save lives, to alleviate suffering 
and to maintain and protect human dignity during and 
in the aftermath of emergencies.”8 The most common 
forms of rapid response to emergencies includes basics 
such as the provision of shelter, food, water, sanitation, 
and emergency health and security services to the 
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Many an emerging economy 
has its own conceptualization of 
peaceful coexistence.
victims of armed conflicts or natural disasters. The 
distinguishing attributes of humanitarian assistance 
are the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, 
and independence. By definition, humanitarian 
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yet less relevant for the purposes of this paper: Are 
BRICS and the other rising actors of development really 
committed to the humanitarian agenda?5 Or do they 
use humanitarian assistance as a means to challenge 
the hegemony of great powers over the international 
order? Second, and more important, what are the 
traits that set Turkey apart from the others? To better 
understand these diametrical differences, one must be 
current with the ongoing debate over the commitment 
to and capacities of emerging donors in becoming 
responsible and reliable actors of development and 
humanitarian assistance.
Established donors versus emerging donors
Since 2009 the BRICS countries and the other emerging 
powers have stepped up as reliable providers of aid. In 
subsequent communiqués issued since the first BRICS 
summit in that year, the group has maintained that the 
current international order was not sustainable, as 
Turkey’s short but voluminous 
track record as a humanitarian 
state offers insights into the virtues 
of bilateral and unconditional 
assistance. 
assistance thus has to be free of conditions and not 
driven by accomplishing any military goals. Although 
this is the accepted norm among the experts and 
veteran practitioners in the field, credible monitoring 
organizations point out that these principles have been 
violated more frequently by established donors for the 
last decade, especially in active conflict zones such as 
Afghanistan and Iraq as well as in fragile states that 
are deemed safe havens for terrorist organizations. 
The 2012 Oxfam report indicates that “in Afghanistan, 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Somalia and 
elsewhere, donors and military forces have made aid 
conditional on the political and military cooperation of 
communities and aid organizations; and have used aid 
to buy information or compliance with military forces.”9
Official development assistance, on the other hand, 
covers financial and material resources provided to 
promote the broader economic development and 
the welfare of developing countries.10 Yet, unlike 
humanitarian assistance, development aid essentially 
comes with political goals. ODA may be committed 
towards engendering political transformations in the 
recipient countries. Although the aid itself may target 
the reduction of poverty and promotion of economic 
and social development, the institutions that ODA 
empowers may be accompanied by a certain ideology 
(e.g., IMF financial assistance on the conditionality of 
implementing an open market economy).
The underlying principles of ODA dictate that it 
must be provided by official agencies, including 
state and local governments, or by their executive 
agencies. Furthermore, each ODA transaction must 
be administered with the promotion of the economic 
development and welfare of developing countries as 
its main objective. Last, ODA has to be concessional 
in character and conveys a grant element of at least 
25 percent. ODA does not include military aid, though 
it can be extended to non-combatant UN-administered 
or UN-approved peace operations to enhance human 
rights, election monitoring, rehabilitation of demobilized 
soldiers and or national infrastructure, restoration of 
administrative functions of the state. Assistance to 
refugees, on the other hand, is considered ODA only 
for the duration of the first 12 months of refugees’ 
stay in the host country. Activities combating terrorism 
are not reportable as ODA, “as they generally target 
perceived threats to donor, as much as to recipient 
countries, rather than focusing on the economic and 
social development of the recipient.”11
Attaching political and economic conditions to official 
development assistance is a common practice among 
the traditional donors. Although the emerging donors 
ardently criticize this practice, many of them also 
resort to similar, albeit subtle, political and economic 
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towards engendering political 
transformations in the recipient 
countries.
considerations when determining the beneficiary 
countries. However, there are several golden rules of 
engagement that both traditional and emerging donors 
must abide by for effective delivery of humanitarian 
relief. The first and most important of all is that 
“humanitarian aid ‘does no harm’ and is sensitive to 
conflict.”12 Second, it cannot be a means to achieve a 
military objective or a political goal.13 In other words, 
humanitarian aid should not be provided on the 
condition of cooperation with military forces or supplying 
information for counterinsurgency operations. Any aid 
given on the basis of recipients’ political and military 
cooperation dismantles the founding principle of “do no 
harm.” Third, the aid must be comprehensive; it should 
not be confiscated by a political aid; and the donors must 
ensure that it benefits all walks of a society, especially 
the lowest common denominator. Fourth, community 
support and ownership of the relief program must be 
ensured. Turkey’s and many other emerging donors’ 
experiences demonstrate that from health services to 
school constructions, the projects that communities 
support and own are more cost-effective and stand a 
better chance to endure.14 Last, the aid must be free 
of ideology.
The traditional donors, especially the United States and 
the United Kingdom, have often come under criticism 
for violating the “do no harm” clause by associating aid 
with their greater military and political objectives in the 
conflict-affected countries. This is also a derivative of 
a foreign policy infested with realpolitik. In fact, since 
the European reconstruction at the end of World War 
II, both ODA and humanitarian assistance have been 
the preferred instruments of great powers in advancing 
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their broader hegemonic aspirations. In the dawn of 
the “war on terrorism,” showcased by the invasion of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, “winning the hearts and minds” 
have been the popular mantra of the twenty-first 
century relief programs that hide subtle, yet prominent, 
political, economic and military intentions.15
The communiqués from the five consecutive BRICS 
summits (the last one held in Durban in South Africa 
in 2013) and the existing literature on the emerging 
powers like Turkey so far ensure that the emerging 
donors are less likely to imitate the aforementioned 
practices that they have criticized in the first place.16 
In fact, both BRICS and the others pledge their 
support for the development of LDCs, with special 
attention to fragile states in Africa. In spite of this 
pledge, however, there are still suspicions whether the 
commitments from emerging donors are long-term and 
sustainable. In tandem with this question, other critics 
of the mushrooming interests of the emerging donors in 
humanitarian aid argue that the real reason behind their 
involvement may have to do with consolidating power 
over their former and present spheres of influence.
Brazil, Russia, and China’s giving trends demonstrate 
significant patterns to support this claim. Russia makes 
an important case study in this regard. The majority of 
the Russian aid is directed towards the former Soviet 
republics—Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, as well as 
countries and territories such as Afghanistan, North 
Korea, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Serbia, 
Pakistan, and Somalia.”17 [T]his reflects some continuity 
with Soviet aid policies: countries such as North Korea 
became Soviet aid recipients during the Cold War era 
and continued to receive aid from Russia after the break-
up of the Soviet Union. The geographical distribution of 
Russia’s aid must be viewed in the context of its long-
term strategic ambitions. Russia regards former Soviet 
republics as its sphere of influence, and its willingness 
to maintain close ties with them explains why they 
receive such a large proportion of its aid.”18 This 
observation reveals the following important conclusion 
about Russia, which can easily be generalized to other 
emerging donors too: “The regional focus of Russian 
aid effort has caused many experts to conclude that its 
motivation for becoming a donor once more is primarily 
one of realpolitik.”19
When we focus on the Brazilian and Chinese 
humanitarian assistance patterns, we observe a similar 
regional focus. Brazil, for example, has contributed 
over $1.6 billion in international cooperation activities 
over the past couple of year; however, the majority of 
this capacity has been invested in Latin America and in 
security sector. Only after 2010, Africa overtook Latin 
America and Caribbean as the largest recipient region of 
Brazilian technical cooperation assistance.20 Similarly, 
according to the figures of the China Foundation 
Center and Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 
2013, certain regions of Africa as well as a few South 
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Turkey differs fundamentally 
from both traditional and 
emerging donors in terms of its 
-humanitarian commitments 
to conflict-affected and fragile 
states. 
East Asian countries emerge as the top recipient of the 
Chinese ODA. Similarly striking is that China imports 
high commodity minerals from most of these countries.
Turkey as a responsible development actor
Turkey differs fundamentally from both traditional 
and emerging donors in terms of its -humanitarian 
commitments to conflict-affected and fragile states. 
The four distinct features of Turkey’s perspective on 
engaging the states in need can be summarized in 
terms of Amartya Sen’s conceptualization of resources 
in economic development. In that regard, first, Turkey 
has the instrument factor; that is, Turkey uses its foreign 
policy as an effective tool in establishing links with the 
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Figure 1: Turkey's ODA (RKY), Direct Aid (DYT), NGO Aid 
(STKY) and Other Official Assistance (DRA) 
Source: 2012 TIKA Report on Turkey's Development Aid
beneficiary states. Second, its impressive growth rate 
and economic performance in the last several years 
have provided Turkey with the confidence factor. In 
other words, driven from its own experience Turkey 
is apt to offer non-partisan, ideology-free, sustainable 
and inclusive economic growth strategies as well as 
models for many LDCs and fragile states in the region. 
Third, through its historical and cultural links to region, 
aided by its identity as a democracy with predominant 
Muslim population well on its way to join the EU, Turkey 
exercises significant soft power over the majority of the 
fragile states in its immediate and broader vicinity. The 
fourth attribute is the institutional factor, which refers 
to the over-concentration of power in state institutions.
Translation of these principles into practice reveals 
$3.4 billion21 worth gross aid per annum committed 
by Turkish state. This sum includes both ODA and 
humanitarian assistance figures.
An important trait of Turkish engagement in this 
field is the priority it gives humanitarian assistance 
within its entire official development assistance. In 
2012, for example, Turkey was among the most 
generous counties with over USD 1 billion it donated 
in humanitarian assistance to the countries in need.22 
Only in 2012, Turkey increased its contributions by 
$775 million.23
Turkey substantiates this pledge by providing 
invaluable know-how and on-the-ground training. 
Turkish civilian capacity has been instrumental in 
building judiciaries, education and health care systems, 
training police force and doctors, as well as enhancing 
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agrarian production through direct aid and transfer of 
knowledge. The term “civilian capacity” in this context 
refers to “non-uniformed civilian individuals or groups 
deployed overseas to crisis or post-conflict settings by 
(or coordinated through) their respective governments. 
The term includes personnel deployed through bilateral 
cooperation programs as well as those deployed 
through the United Nations, regional organizations 
or other intergovernmental organizations. It includes 
civilian capacity deployed from the public sector or 
private sectors, including academia and civil society 
organizations that is in some way ‘coordinated’ under 
government auspices.”24
Moreover, Turkey prioritizes a sustainable and long-
term civilian capacity assistance over in-kind and 
monetary aid. Under the coordination of various state 
institutions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the 
Ministry of Development, Turkish Cooperation and 
Coordination Agency (TİKA) to Disaster and Emergency 
Management Presidency (AFAD), Turkish doctors, 
engineers, educators, constructors and various aid 
workers provide long-term and sustainable services to 
conflict-affected and disaster-stricken geographies. As 
will be outlined in the rest of this report, Turkey’s civilian 
capacity deployments to countries like Somalia and 
Afghanistan have made real, observable differences in 
people’s lives in the regions where traditional donors 
are scarcely engaged. Turkey’s nonpartisan approach 
to humanitarian assistance gives Turkish relief 
agencies an unprecedented access to these areas. 
Acting solely on the needs of beneficiaries without any 
kind of political motive or self-interest, Turkish relief 
programs yield measurable and sustainable results 
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The essence of Turkish assistance to conflict sensitive 
countries is therefore its commitment to state building. 
An important trait of Turkish 
engagement in this field is the 
priority it gives humanitarian 
assistance.
Figure 2: Turkey had the largest increase in its humanitarian assistance 
in 2012 and was among the top 5 donors, allocating 13 percent of its GDP
Source: Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013
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that benefit broader communities and consequently 
contribute to Turkey’s reputation as a humanitarian 
state. In brief, Turkey’s humanitarian foreign policy, 
coupled with responsible and non-ideological aid 
strategy contributes to Turkey’s image as a reliable and 
responsible development actor.
Turkey’s new role has also stoked curiosity about its 
strategy in both domestic and international discourse. 
Turkey’s bilateral engagement with the recipient 
countries and unconditionality of its humanitarian 
assistance are the two areas that have been scrutinized 
widely in the global humanitarian assistance discourse. 
The bilateral engagement with the recipient countries 
has a number of indispensable advantages. A vital 
offshoot of a bilateral engagement, for instance, is the 
opportunity it provides the donor to get to know the 
actors on the ground well. This knowledge is essential 
for symmetric distribution of the aid to all of the actors, 
rather than leaving it to the discretion of a political elite 
in a society.
However, the bilateral engagement model also brings 
out a number of serious coordination problems, 
especially in the areas of personnel deployment (level 
of expertise and personnel insurance packages), 
absence of a reliable monitoring and evaluation model 
and language constraints. Encountered with the 
limitation from the absence of reliable monitoring and 
evaluation model, Turkey has taken a new initiative 
to build a foreign aid strategy. The Foreign Aid Law is 
also in the process of creation. Turkey, nonetheless, 
remains acutely aware of the international analysis 
of global dynamics but prefers bilateral development 
assistance arrangements. Roughly 90 percent of aid 
efforts are coordinated directly between Turkey/TIKA 
and the donor recipient country. The main reason 
why Turkey prefers bilateral arrangements is the 
effectiveness of this model in expediting the process 
and delivering tangible results, according to the Turkish 
officials who have frequently commented on this issue.
Relaying aid via a multilateral mechanism is not 
foolproof either. One-size-fits-all prescription employed 
by multilateral institutions does not always guarantee 
a match between the right type of aid and the 
beneficiary. More often than not, the beneficiary may 
not even have an unrestricted access to provisions. In 
such standardized way of aid distribution, the donors 
are afforded little freedom to adjust their assistance 
according to the needs of the beneficiaries. However, 
multilateral initiatives have their perks. Especially as far 
as best practices are concerned, delivering assistance 
as part of a comprehensive multilateral system 
increases transparency, accountability, coordination 
and evaluation of humanitarian assistance. Being 
part of a multilateral system especially pays off if the 
donor wants to expand the breadth of its assistance. 
In fact, being part of a multilateral system enhances an 
emerging donor’s capacity to reform the current order 
that was founded and operated by established donors.
Turkey deliberately stays away from nation building; 
that is, it does not impose its political culture, or national 
security interests, on the recipient countries. This 
key difference sets Turkey apart from other nations 
in the region that attach their political conditions and 
governing principles to the assistance they make 
available. The Ministry of Development reiterates that 
state building is an important pillar of Turkey’s global 
vision. In addition, although the focus on the link 
between security and development has increased in 
the last five years, Turkish aid policy has not wavered 
from its aforementioned principles of ethical and 
humane foreign policy. In fact, Turkey’s objective take 
on this enterprise draws beneficiaries even closer in 
order to learn from Turkish experience in state building.
Since the early 2000s, Turkish assistance to post-
conflict countries seems to have shifted dramatically 
from military missions to civilian capacity assistance. 
The types of assistance Turkey has provided so 
far in the five fundamental clusters of post-conflict 
reconstruction are: basic services, government 
functionality, basic safety and security, inclusive political 
processes, economic revitalization. Furthermore, 
Figure 3: Organizational Chart of Official and Private Turkish Aid 
Coordination/Provision Agencies
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Turkish development and humanitarian aid efforts 
are considered as functional conflict resolution, or 
conflict sensitive development, responses. If there is 
an ongoing conflict in an aid-receiving country, Turkey 
adopts a conflict sensitive development approach. A 
development project is effectively used to bring the 
conflicting parties together in order to transform the 
conflict. Turkey has been involved in a variety of similar 
facilitations without any kind of labeling or asserting 
prejudice. Therefore, Turkish strength lies first and 
foremost with Turkey’s historical and social depth in its 
region, second with its influence over the region, and 
third, its ability to respond rapidly to the developments 
within its immediate neighborhood.
By remaining closely engaged with the majority of 
the conflict-affected nations and the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), Turkey observes that the sources 
of most daunting conflicts today stem from an unequal 
distribution of resources, negligence of the LDC 
grievances, as well as the lack of dialogue between 
conflicting parties. There are thus three vital points 
to keep in mind when thinking about Turkey’s efforts 
in peacebuilding: Prioritization, dilemma between 
multilateralism and bilateralism, and development aid 
to fragile states. Another problem that needs to be 
addressed, on the other hand, is Turkey’s absorption 
and response capacity to requests from beneficiaries. 
An equally challenging and immediate shortcoming 
in this vein is the lack of collaboration among public 
offices when addressing foreign state-building efforts. 
Turkey has the capacity; yet, coordination still stumbles 
on a number of roadblocks.
In 2011 Turkey contributed nearly $3.2 million in Official 
Development Aid (ODA) to Sudan (not South). Turkish 
aid made up for the 14 percent of the total of the ODA to 
Sudan for governance, peace and security from 2007 – 
2011. Turkey’s ODA has grown exponentially between 
2002 and 2011. According to TIKA’s own development 
report for 2012 Sudan received 21.33 million dollars in 
2011 in humanitarian assistance aid, demonstrating 
quite a difference in reporting. The countries that 
were officially granted the most Turkish development 
assistance were Syria, Egypt, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Palestine, Kazakhstan and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, respectively.
According to figures in the 2013 Global Humanitarian 
Assistance Report, all in all Turkey donated $1.04 
billion in urgent/emergency humanitarian aid in 2012, 
elevating Turkey to the highest league of donors and 
ranking it behind the United States, the European Union 
and the United Kingdom. That same year, the amount 
of humanitarian aid provided globally decreased 5.9 
percent. Turkey also ranks as the third-largest donor in 
proportion to its gross national product (GNP), having 
provided aid worth 0.13 percent of its GNP.
Official figures also show that Turkey has increased its 
provision of aid tenfold in the last decade. The Turkish 
development aid increased to $2.533 billion dollars in 
2012—a 38 percent increase over 2011. Accordingly, 
Turkey ranked first among Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in 
terms of the increase of its aid provision.
Aid to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) takes 
a significant share of Turkey’s humanitarian relief 
program. Turkey donated $1.053 billion to these 
countries between 2008 and 2012, $337 million of 
which was provided in 2012 alone. Africa also receives 
a great deal of foreign aid from Turkey at $727 million. 
In addition to the official provision of aid, donations from 
Turkish NGOs reached $111 million in 2012. While the 
1% 1% 1% 2%
4%
5%
11%
17%
17%
33%
8%
Figure 4: Turkey's top 10 recipients of Turkey's official humanitarian 
assistance 2007-2011
Source: Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013 
Kenya US$4m
Afghanistan US$5m
Haiti US$7m
Sudan US$11m
West Bank & Gaza Strip US$17m
Syria US$21m
Libya US$51m
Iraq US$77m
Somalia US$78m
Pakistan US$154m
Others US$39m
Figure 5: Official Development and Humanitarian Assistance From 
Turkey, 2000 – 2012
Source: Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013
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figures for 2012 are only preliminary (and subject to 
change), ODA from Turkey has grown substantially in 
recent years, almost doubling between 2011 and 2012. 
Turkey’s contributions in 2012 make it the 15th largest 
government donor. Official humanitarian assistance has 
also significantly increased to US$1.0 billion in 2012, 
making up over 40% of total ODA and ranking it the 
4th largest donor that year. From 2007 – 2011 Turkey’s 
aid to Sudan totaled 2% of its total official humanitarian 
assistance. Overall from 2011 to 2012, South Sudan 
experienced an increase of $483 million in aid, while 
Sudan experienced a $404 million decrease in aid.25
Turkey’s best practices as a humanitarian state can 
also be observed in other diverse geographies. In Syria, 
Turkey has performed infrastructure building and ethnic 
relations building between 2006 and 2011. In Tunisia, 
Turkey has provided assistance to the government/
public offices with capacity building. The Police 
Department Directorate started building capacity and 
awareness within the department after 1996. Currently, 
Turkish experts train local police in human rights and the 
rule of law in numerous countries. In addition, Turkey 
trains judiciary personnel and provides assistance 
with constitution making in Africa or near Asia. Turkish 
correctional officers are also deployed to improve the 
prison conditions in some of these countries. From 
Somalia to Gaza, Turkish Red Crescent operates 
numerous refugee camps and provides safe heavens 
to hundreds of thousands of internally displaced 
people. In Gaza, the Turkish Red Crescent along 
with other humanitarian relief organizations provide 
medication and textile aid, educational aid, drinking 
water rehabilitation, agricultural projects. Similarly in 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkish relief agencies deploy psycho-
social aid and mediation efforts
Since 2008, TIKA has organized nearly $100 million of 
emergency aid to Iraq, along with the equipment, food, 
shelter and medical supplies sent to Georgia after 
its conflict with Russia, as well as to the Palestinians 
suffering under the Israeli blockade. In the Balkans 
Turkish organizations are reliable addresses for 
development of social and economic infrastructure, 
financing infrastructure and construction projects, 
development of education infrastructure, extending 
humanitarian assistance and donating equipment.
More important, in Afghanistan TIKA has committed 
over $30 million for two prominent Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Wardak and Jawzjan. 
The PRT in Wardak assisted Afghan authorities with 
reconstruction efforts and enhanced development and 
stability within the province. It focused on providing 
health care, education, police training and alternative 
methods of farming to local farmers. Furthermore, all 
projects were coordinated and structured to meet the 
benchmarks of the Afghanistan Compact Document 
and the Interim Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy. TIKA’s efforts aimed to improve the quality 
of life in Afghanistan through the reconstruction of 
its much-needed civilian infrastructure. Examples of 
completed projects include: 68 schools established or 
restored; nursing and midwifery and outpatient clinics 
built or reconstructed; thousands of Afghan police 
officers and soldiers trained; education programs for 
judges, prosecutors and district governors provided, 
and several roads, bridges and wells completed. In 
addition to the aid and assistance given through TIKA 
during this timeframe, Turkish entrepreneurs have also 
completed projects worth nearly $2 billion.26 Similar 
reconstruction projects were undertaken by the PRT 
in Jawzjan, which included a staff of 22 administrative 
personnel to coordinate the efforts of the approximately 
220 deployed experts and advisors from the Turkish 
Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Ministry of Interior, TIKA, Presidency of 
Religious Affairs, several universities, and a police 
special operations team.27
Turkish NGOs at the forefront of capacity building 
and humanitarian aid
Another important attribute of the Turkish humanitarian 
assistance is its commitment to the common lowest 
denominator on the ground. From Afghanistan to 
Somalia, neither civilian nor official donors have ever 
forsaken the real beneficiaries on the ground for political 
elite. Combined with this, the involvement of Turkish 
civil society organizations boosts the quality and 
quantity of Turkish humanitarian assistance. Somalia, 
Afghanistan, and Sudan present important case studies 
in this respect. Similar to the Russian case, Turkish 
humanitarian assistance brings together key agents 
of Turkish bureaucracy with influential NGOs: On the 
Turkey’s contributions in 
2012 make it the 15th largest 
government donor.
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government side the indispensable actors are: the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Development, Interior and 
Justice, TIKA, AFAD, Directorate of Religious Affairs and 
the Turkish Red Crescent (KIZILAY). From the NGOs, 
the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and 
Humanitarian Relief (IHH), Doctors Worldwide: Turkey, 
Dost Eli Foundation, Türkiye Diyanet Foundation, 
Cansuyu Foundation, Yardımeli Foundation, Deniz 
Feneri, Gülistan Foundation, Turgut Özal Schools, and 
Sema Foundation are at the forefront.
The total aid committed by Turkish NGOs remains 
significant at nearly $112 million in 2012, inspite of the 
44 percent decline from the 2011 figure of nearly $200 
million. In 2012 alone, coupled with the grants from 
public institutions and cooperations, Turkish NGOs 
channeled over $150 million to conflict-affected states. 
The breakdown of this figure consists of emergency 
and humanitarian aid worth $55 million, technical and 
project-specific aid of nearly $100 million.28 Turkish 
NGO aid appears to concentrate primarily in Africa, 
followed by the Middle East, Central and South Asia, 
Europe and Far East.
From a longer perspective, Somalia may prove to be 
Turkey’s backdoor into the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Turkey’s work in Somalia has earned it a reputation in 
Africa as a generous and effective rehabilitator of broken 
countries. The more Turkey accomplishes in Somalia, 
the greater its political capital will be throughout the 
region, improving its investment prospects and political 
alliances with countries from Mozambique to Gambia. 
This will be especially true in majority-Muslim nations, 
where the importance of Sunni Islam in everyday life 
gives Turkish investors and envoys an advantage over 
their non-Muslim counterparts, given their familiarity 
with Islamic finance, social mores, and shared 
holidays.29
Since 2005, the makers of Turkish foreign policy have 
expanded the country’s focus, opening up to regions that 
were considered faraway territories in former decades. 
A significant step has been Turkey’s new Africa policy, 
which was created through a joint governmental, NGO 
and business community involvement. The motives 
behind this new policy are to consolidate Turkey’s 
position in international politics, benefit from African 
markets at a time of economic crisis, and support 
Turkish business and NGO community involvement in 
this continent.30
Turkey’s cumulative official aid to Africa has reached 
approximately $1 billion, a substantial portion of $2.5 
billion total global aid. Turkish schools, from elementary 
education to universities, have been founded in Africa, 
and Turkish NGOs are among the most visible on 
the continent.31 Somalia is an important case that 
demonstrates all three key attributes of Turkish 
humanitarian assistance, functioning in harmony 
with one another. These are the strong interests 
and presence of civilian Turkish aid organizations 
in treacherous and hostile regions like south-central 
Somalia; Turkish state’s official support for these 
organizations and role as a facilitator; and the direct 
engagement with local beneficiaries regardless of 
gender, race, ethnicity, and ideology. Perhaps, the 
most important factor that distinguishes the Turkish 
aid providers from their Western counterparts is that 
the absence of political, economic, and military goals 
attached to the aid that Turkish relief organizations 
give. This approach provides Turkish donors with 
access to the areas that are off limits to traditional 
donors. In Somalia’s case, these are mainly the al-
Shaabab controlled areas.32 Even though, this is a 
positive development in terms of delivering the aid on 
equal footing, the outreach of Turkish organizations 
to an extremist terrorist organization creates concern 
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among the traditional donors.
In the short term, however, the active engagement 
of both official and civilian aid organizations with the 
country has immense and tangible benefits. Kimse Yok 
Mu?, Cansuyu, Doctors Worldwide, The Foundation for 
Human Rights and Freedom and Humanitarian Relief 
(IHH), Beşir, Deniz Feneri, Yardım Eli and Hasene are 
the principal foundations that provide relief in Somalia in 
a range of areas from medicine to education, sanitation 
to water purification, fisheries to food provision.
These institutions also claim that they cooperate with 
over 700 domestic (Somali) and international NGOs. 
The coordination and cooperation between IHH and 
Doctors Worldwide are exemplary; the collaboration 
between the two institutions has resulted in 75,000 
cataract surgeries, curing over 30,000 patients suffering 
nutritional problems, prevention of children’s diseases 
through distributing cattle meat. Other institutions have 
also addressed significant emergency situations such 
as lack of potable water and food. Hasene, in this 
respect, honors its motto “Think Global, Act Local.” 
Hasene’s operations provide home for orphans and 
erect facilities to train local community in a number of 
vocations, including fishing.
Conclusion: Areas of contention and policy 
recommendations
Turkey’s transformation from an aid recipient to a donor 
country in a short amount of time offers a host of best 
practices for both established and emerging donors. 
Turkey’s quick metamorphosis, first and foremost, 
signifies the importance of constructing foreign policy on 
the right set of principles. The concepts “humanitarian 
state” and “humanitarian diplomacy” are henceforth 
crafted to project Turkey’s commitment to and respect 
for an ethics-based foreign policy. As corroborated 
by the cases presented in this essay, preservation of 
universal human rights and respect for the dignity of 
human life are the foundations of Turkey’s engagement 
with all other nations—whether they are industrialized, 
emerging, least developed, or fragile. Nonetheless, 
putting ethics, human rights and human development 
first provides Turkey with a rare—and almost unique—
vantage point in its relations with conflict-affected 
countries. The absence of realpolitik and embedded 
security interests in its foreign policy increases the 
breadth, efficacy, and legitimacy of Turkish aid. As 
the data demonstrate, Turkish aid penetrates deep 
into the least stable and most heated conflict zones. 
From Somalia to Afghanistan, both official and civilian 
aid have curbed human suffering and considerably 
improved health and economic conditions. In most of 
these countries, Turkish relief organizations and aid 
workers are actively present on the ground, curing 
preventable children’s diseases, drilling water wells, 
providing staple food and sanitary supplies, building 
schools, training locals in fishery and husbandry. 
That Turkish agents perform these tasks in certain 
zones that are off-limits to international organizations 
and delegations from established donors for security 
reasons gives a rare edge to Turkish aid work over the 
others.
There is room, however, for improvement even 
in Turkey’s activities as a responsible actor of 
development. Countless interviews with representatives 
from a number of government agencies in charge of 
aid coordination and delivery, as well as delegates from 
private relief organizations, independently concur the 
following shortcomings. First and foremost, coordination 
emerges as a fundamental problem in all walks of 
aid provision. With respect to government efforts to 
coordinate aid, the most recurrent problem is a lack 
of communication between key government ministries 
and agencies including TIKA, ministries of foreign 
affairs, development, health, and justice. Furthermore, 
the data also point toward lack of coordination between 
Turkish relief funds operating in the field and country 
representatives of vital government agencies like TİKA. 
To alleviate this problem, an interagency cooperation 
scheme ought to be developed and implemented in 
haste. Universities and think tanks with reliable conflict 
resolution and civilian capacity building programs can 
be recruited with a view to developing a functional 
interagency cooperation system within government 
bureaucracy.
Second, Turkey appears to have been caught in the 
middle of an existential debate over the multilateral 
versus bilateral approach to effective aid delivery. As 
the cases previously discussed illustrate (especially 
the practices in sub-Saharan Africa, South and Central 
24,96
0,27
3,34
0,61
0,52
3,8
7,4
16,28
0,28
45
0,28
0,71
1,53
8,23
3,35
8,28
7,36
12,75
2,42
İHH
ADANA DOST ELLER
BİLKENT Ü.
CANSUYU YARD. VE DAY. DER.
ESAFED
KUTUP YILDIZI SAĞLIK GÖNÜLLÜLERİ DER.
SADAKATAŞI DER.
DİYANET VAKFI
YERYÜZÜ DOKTORLARI DER.
TÜRKMENELİ İŞBİRLİĞİ VE KÜLTÜR VAKFI
Figure 8: Total annual aid by an individual NGO (million USD)
Source: 2012 TIKA Report on Turkey's Development Aid
12
POMEAS POLICY PAPERNo.2, JULY 2014
Asia), Turkish aid favors a bilateral engagement model. 
That is, both agencies and their field offices prefers to 
directly engage the beneficiary country without being 
part of any UN-sponsored multilateral system. The 
requests of the host country are submitted to TIKA 
directly. Having processed this information, TIKA relays 
the request to the relevant departments in a number of 
ministries. This process hardly necessitates Turkish aid 
agents to be part of or access any international roster to 
better understand not only the situation on the ground 
but the conditions of the host countries. Because Turkey 
has just penetrated the vast sphere of international aid 
giving, coordinating its relief operations with multilateral 
organizations can render a number of advantages in 
generating more thorough pre-deployment analyses 
and strategies. However, this recommendation should 
not be read as an endorsement of the multilateral 
model, for it has also its own shortcomings. The most 
important deficiency attributed to the multilateral 
systems is one of confidence. Veteran experts in 
humanitarian aid criticize the established donors that 
operate through multilateral system on their practices 
of favoritism, bunkering, and securitization of aid. 
These seasoned analysts often point to arbitrary 
decisions of established donors and their skew towards 
bilateralism in picking their partners on the ground. 
Therefore, though it should not be fully immersed in 
a bilateral engagement model, Turkey should also 
coordinate its efforts with international community to a 
healthy degree, while taking all other functions of the 
multilateral system with a grain of salt.
Third, a more frequent blunder that targets all donor 
countries is their perception as though they favor a 
particular political or ethnic faction over others. Locals 
subscribe to this perception often when a country’s 
aid focuses in a specific region where certain political 
faction or ethnic group is the majority. Even though 
this may not be the donor’s intention, its activities may 
be confined into one region controlled by one ethnic 
group due to budgetary, geographical and security 
restrictions. The recent targeting of Turkish relief 
entities and officials in Somalia suggest that Turkey is 
not immune to this blunder. In some of these countries 
where conflict roars with full momentum Turkey’s well 
intentioned initiatives appear to have succumbed to this 
trap. A more deliberative and analytical pre-deployment 
assessment stage at ministerial and interagency level 
may help generate solutions to this perception issue. 
Collaborating with seasoned international organizations 
on the ground can also improve the knowledgebase on 
the endemic sensitivities on the ground.
Fourth, Turkey must recognize the changing nature 
of the debate with respect to vices and virtues of 
bilateralism versus multilateralism. A new discourse on 
the horizon in fact highlights the contribution of regional 
organizations to facilitation and maintenance of peace 
in conflict-affected countries. From Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Turkey 
already enjoys considerable leadership and political 
weight in most of these regional organizations. By 
using this influence, Turkey can harness and channel 
the political capital and mandate of these organizations 
towards finding lasting solutions to some of the most 
protracted conflicts in its immediate vicinity and broader 
region.
Overall, Turkey’s sprint into becoming an influential and 
respected humanitarian state can only be bolstered with 
these additional measures taken into practice. Already 
a reliable partner in peacebuilding and peacekeeping, 
Turkey is also embarked upon a path to claim its stake in 
international community as an innovative and effective 
provider of civilian capacity assistance, inclusive and 
sustainable growth models, and functioning institutions 
of deliberative and participatory citizenship. Preparing 
to take over the G20 presidency next year, and 
thanks to its track record and accomplishments as a 
“humanitarian state,” Turkey demonstrates that there 
are better alternatives to realpolitik in a country’s plight 
for a responsible global leadership.
Turkey must recognize the 
changing nature of the debate 
with respect to vices and 
virtues of bilateralism versus 
multilateralism.
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